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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

SHELLY HIPWELL, an individual
by and through her guardians,
SHERRY
JENSEN
and
SHAYNE
HIPWELL,
Case No. 920218
PlaintiffsRespondents ,
t

vs.

Priority No. 11

ROGER SHARP, TIM W. HEALY, an :
DOES I through X,
i

DefendantsAppellants.

:

BRIEF OF INTERVENER STATE OF UTAH
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State agrees with the statements of jurisdiction
included in the parties' briefs.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The State has no direct interest in the outcome of this
case and appears pursuant to its statutory right under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-30-11 to be heard on the constitutional issues raised by
the parties.

Therefore, this brief addresses only those issues

stated in the parties' briefs.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are
attached as Addendum A.
Utah Constitution, article I, section 11.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-3, -4, -10 and -34 (1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State understands the nature of the case, course of
proceedings below and facts to be as set forth in the parties'
briefs.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The
governmental

appellants'

contention

that

the

proprietary/

distinction did not apply to the State or its

subdivisions at common law, but only to municipalities, is wellfounded.

Thus, Hipwell had no common law remedy against any

governmental

entity

for

the

injuries

she

sustained

at

the

University Hospital. Moreover, under the discretionary/ministerial
function distinction as applied at common law to determine official
immunity, Hipwell had no remedy against any government employee for
those injuries.

Thus, the damages limitation provisions of the

Utah Governmental Immunity Act did not transgress Hipwell's rights
under the open courts clause.

Neither were Hipwell's due process

or equal protection right infringed by the Act where the Act did
not deprive her of any common law right of recovery.
Even if Hipwell had a constitutionally protected interest
in recovering for her personal injuries, the analysis of the
plurality in Condemarin warrants reexamination.
individual

right infringed

In weighing the

against the extent to which that

particular infringement only would protect the public treasury, the
Condemarin balancing test fails to take into account the overall
effect

of

the

Act

in

broadening
2

individual

remedies

for

governmental torts. Whatever the constitutional basis of review,
that overall effect must be considered to avoid straight-jacketing
the legislature in a manner that prevents it advancing legitimate
governmental objectives.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE PROPRIETARY/GOVERNMENTAL DISTINCTION DID
NOT APPLY TO THE STATE AT COMMON LAW
As explained in the appellants' briefs, the proprietary/
governmental

distinction

did not

apply to the

State or its

subdivisions at common law, but only to municipalities. Indeed, in
arguing that at the time of the adoption of the open courts clause
the State engaged only in functions that would be considered
governmental

under

the proprietary/governmental

test, Hipwell

concedes that a right to recover for personal injuries resulting
from proprietary functions of the State had not been established at
that time.

As stated by this Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft

Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 676 n. 3 (Utah 1985), "the common law at the
time of statehood provides a measure of the kinds of legal remedies
that the framers must have had in mind (at least in scope if not in
form) for the protection of life, property, and reputation." Thus,
the open courts clause does not protect any right to recover for
personal injuries resulting from proprietary functions of the
State.
Hipwell's hypothesis that state government existed in
only a primordial

form at the time of the adoption

3

of the

constitution is completely unsupported.1

Moreover, the since the

common law on governmental liability continued to develop even
after the adoption of the constitution, at least until the adoption
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in 1965, Hipwell's hypothesis
fails to explain why, as she concedes, no case arose during that
time

allowing

recovery

against

the

state

based

upon

the

governmental\proprietary test.2
Hipwell's interpretation of the Bingham v. Board of
Education of Oaden Citv, 223 P.2d 432 (Utah 1950), is inaccurate.
Had this Court applied the governmental/proprietary distinction to
the particular function that caused the injury in that case, it
would have denied the city immunity.

The injury in Bingham arose,

not from the school board's alleged negligent performance of its
educational function (i.e., as in failing to teach Jane and Johnny
to read and write), but from the operation of an incinerator to
burn books on school grounds —

a proprietary function.

Thus, it

^ipwell cites Green v. Commonwealth, 435 N.E. 2d 362, 365
(Mass. App. 1982) in support of her hypothesis.
That case,
however, recognized that, before the enactment of the Massachusetts
Tort Claims Act, the "exception for private nuisance was the only
judicially created exception to the otherwise general principle
that the Commonwealth was immune from tort liability absent a clear
statutory authorization to the contrary." The Massachusetts court
went on to expressly overrule the lower court's decision applying
the proprietary/governmental distinction to the state on the ground
of stare decisis.
Thus, Green refutes, rather than supports
Hipwell's theory.
2

Meanwhile, courts in numerous other jurisdictions expressly
declined to apply the distinction to the state. See James, Tort
Liability of Governmental Units, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 610, 619-20 &
n. 55 (1955). The more plausible explanation for the absence of
any Utah cases directly on point is that the nonapplicability of
the distinction was scarcely to be doubted.

4

was the character of the school board itself, rather than the
nature of the particular function that gave rise to the injury,
that shielded the city from liability. The same holds true for the
Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Comm'n, 70 P.2d 857 (Utah 1937),
case also cited by Hipwell.

In both cases, the court considered

the purpose of the agency involved (i.e. whether or not it was
performing a governmental function) in determining whether the
agency was an arm of the state to be accorded absolute immunity and
accorded no significance to the particular function that gave rise
to the cause of action.3

Cases such as Bakken v. State, 219 N.W.

2d 834 (N.D. 1928) (declining to apply sovereign immunity to the
operation of the North Dakota Mill & Elevator Association by the
state) are similarly explained and thus fail to support Hipwell's
theory.

See also. Union Trust Co. v. State of California, 99 P.

183, 188-89 (Cal. 1909) (holding board of works immune for breach
of contract

on ground that

"the opening of streets and the

condemnation of the necessary lands . . . are among the most
familiar governmental powers"); Bank of the United States v.
Planter's Bank of Georgia, 24 U.S. 904, 907-08 (1824) (holding the
Eleventh Amendment does not apply to action by the United States to
recover as assignee of promissory notes issued by a bank of which
the state was an incorporator, recognizing that "many States of
this Union who have an interest in Banks, are not suable even in

3

It is worth noting that under the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, immunity for negligence claims such as those apparently
involved in Bingham and Campbell would likely be waived. See Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-10.

5

their own Courts; yet they never exempt the corporation from being
sued.

The State of Georgia, by giving to the Bank the capacity to

sue and be sued, voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign
character, so far as respects the transactions of the Bank, and
waives all the privileges of that character.")
II.
IN LIMITING THE REMEDY FOR WRONGS COMMITTED BY
GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES TO THAT AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY, ABSENT FRAUD OR MALICE,
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT FULLY
COMPORTS WITH THE OPEN COURTS CLAUSE
Hipwell correctly observes that the fact that the State
was absolutely immune at common law, regardless of whether the
particular

function

that

caused

the

plaintiff's

injury

is

characterized as proprietary or governmental, does not end the open
courts inquiry.

To the extent section 63-30-4(4), which limits

recovery against government employees personally to cases in which
fraud or malice is established, infringes upon any common law right
of recovery, it must be also be examined under the open courts
clause.

This is a more complex question than was recognized in

Hipwell's brief.
A.

The Act Created Remedies Where None Existed At

Common Law Against Either The Governmental Entity Or Its Employees
First, Hipwell assumes, without analyzing the issue, that
there existed at common law a broad right to recover for personal
injuries against employees of a state-owned hospital. This was far
from the case.
Recognizing that a suit against a public officer was
6

often in effect a suit against the state, and that, if held
personally

liable

for

their

official

judgments,

responsible

individuals would either be discouraged from accepting public
employment or be unduly intimidated in carrying out their duties,
courts granted public employees extensive immunities at common law.
Indeed, as acknowledged in 1955, ten years before the enactment of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, "The courts have tended in
recent years to build up a larger and larger area of privilege or
immunity for the officer with respect to his official conduct."
Fleming James, Jr., Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their
Officers,

22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 610, 640 (1955)•
The discretionary/ministerial function distinction was

the most widely-applied basis of official immunity at common law.4
Under the discretionary/ministerial function analysis, an official
was held liable only for ministerial acts, but not for acts which
required the exercise of discretion or judgment.

See, e.g.,

Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1977).
In 1946, the term "discretionary function" was imported
into the realm of governmental entity liability by the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA"), which partially waived the absolute sovereign
immunity of the United States. Section 2680(a) of Title 28 of the
United States Code excepts any claim based on the exercise or
performance, or failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary

A

Others include the absolute immunity granted judicial
officers and the good faith immunity generally accorded prison
officials. See, e.g., Sheffield v. Turner, 212 Utah 2d 314, 31617, 445 P.2d 367,
(Utah 1968).

7

function or duty from the FTCA's waiver of the United States'
immunity from liability for injuries caused by the negligence or
wrongful conduct of its employees.
Under

the

FTCA,

the

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).

term

"discretionary

function"

acquired a new, more restrictive meaning than it had in the common
law of official immunity.

"Beginning with the two root cases of

Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427
(1953) and Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76
S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955), the lines in federal cases have
been consistently drawn between those functions ascribable to the
policy making level and those to the operational level." Little v.
Div. of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983).

Since the

policy/operational distinction developed under the FTCA, it had
never applied to the common law of official immunity.

See, e.g.,

Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 86 (1845) (post-master general immune
from liability for writing-off debt to plaintiff); Hicks v. Davis,
163 Pac. 799 (1917) (state auditor refused to determine validity of
claim against state).

Cf. Bovce v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 866

(S.D. Iowa 1950) (United States immune from liability for damages
caused negligent dynamite blasting); Harris v. United States, 205
F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953) (United States immune from liability for
negligent

herbicide

spraying).

Cf.

Bermann,

Integrating

Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1175,
1182 & n. 49 (1977) (noting that whether official and entity
liability

are

co-extensive

depends

on

whether

the

term

"discretionary" is given the same meaning for purposes of both

8

governmental and officer immunity).
The difference in the meaning of the term "discretionary"
in the two contexts was expressly recognized in Estate of Burks,
438 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1970).

In Burks, the court rejected the

argument that a Veterans' Administration hospital administrator and
psychiatrist should be held liable for negligently permitting the
escape of a mental patient, stating:
Appellant urges that "discretion" means
the same thing in the context of executive
privilege as it does under the Tort Claims
Act, where the government has been held liable
for negligence in the treatment or custodial
care of patients.
We cannot agree that "discretion" can be
read so narrowly as it is now under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, which has been
liberally interpreted to provide a remedy
against the government.
The Act's liberal
construction ought not to be extended to limit
the immunity of federal employees. Liability
of the government itself for wrongs committed
by its employees will not have the same
inhibiting effect on governmental operations
as the personal liability of an official. The
Tort Claims Act seeks to bar only those suits
where the "discretion" is that involved in the
formation
of
policy,
rather
than
its
operation.
Id. at 234.

Accordingly, the court held the hospital director

immune and stated, "[w]hile Doctor Ging [the treating psychiatrist]
had less discretion, nevertheless in her diagnoses and treatment of
patients and in her supervisory powers over other employees she was
vested with discretion.

She is entitled to immunity from suit."

Id. at 235.
Thus, contrary to Hipwell's assumption, courts generally
found government physicians immune for medical malpractice and

9

similar claims at common law.
F.2d

See also, Martinez v. Schrock, 537

765 (3d Cir. 1976) (Army surgeons immune from allegedly

negligent performance of gall bladder operation on civilian);
Taylor

v.

Glotfeltv,

psychiatrist

immune

204
from

F.2d

51

liability

(6th
for

Cir.

1952)

allegedly

(prison

defamatory

diagnosis of patient's mental condition).5
In interpreting the "discretionary function" exception of
the

Utah

Act,

this

Court

has

followed

the

lead

of

cases

interpreting section 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act.

See

Doe v. Arquelles, 716 P.2d 279, 282-83_ (Utah 1986); Little v. Div.
of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983); Frank v. State,
613

P.2d

517,

discretionary

519

(Utah

function

1980).

exception

Thus,
as

the

applied

to

scope

of

the

governmental

entities under the Act is far narrower than the immunity for
discretionary functions accorded employees at common law.

In

permitting liability against the entity in circumstances in which

5

Cf. Brown v. Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital, 395
N.W. 2d 18 (Mich Ct. App. 1986) (medical decisions are
discretionary and protected by governmental immunity); but see
Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1977) (adopting Federal
Tort Claims Act definition of discretionary in holding Air Force
physician liable on medical malpractice claim).
As Jackson
demonstrates, the interpretation of discretionary function under
the FTCA influenced the subsequent development of the law of
federal official immunity.
Nevertheless, the Indian Towing
definition of discretionary function was never adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in determining official immunity. See
Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 298 (1988) (declining to "define
the precise boundaries or official immunity or to determine the
level of discretion required before immunity may attach"). In the
federal realm, the issue of official immunity has been largely
resolved by an amendment to the FTCA which expressly immunizes
federal employees. See Federal Employee Liability Reform & Tort
Compensation Act of 1988, 1988 Amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2679.
10

the employee would have been immune at common
discretionary/ministerial

function

doctrine,

law under the
the

Utah

Act

significantly broadens individual remedies for personal injuries
for governmental activities.
B.
Employees

Even Where A Remedy Existed Against Governmental

At Common

Law. The Utah Governmental

Immunity Act

Provides A Constitutionally Adequate Substitute Remedy
Even in cases in which the government employee would have
been found liable under the discretionary/ministerial function test
at

common

law,

the

limited

substitute

remedy

against

the

governmental entity provided by the Act satisfies the open courts
clause.
In upholding the Workers' Compensation and Automobile NoFault Insurance Acts, this Court recognized that a limited remedy
may be substituted for a more complete common law remedy without
transgressing the open courts clause where other benefits of the
substituted remedy compensate for the loss in the scope or value of
the original remedy.
Refining

&

Mining

See Masich v. United

Co.,

191

P.2d

612

States Smelting,

(Utah

1948)

(workers

compensation); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P. 2d 670, 677
(Utah 1985) (discussing workers compensation and automobile nofault insurance provisions).
In substituting a limited remedy against the governmental
entity for the common law remedy against the individual employee,
the Act has significantly enhanced the chances of actual recovery
for the victims of governmental torts in two ways:

11

1.

The Act substituted a solvent defendant for an often

financially irresponsible defendant.
In the opening paragraph of his essay,

Integrating

Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1175
(1977), George A. Bermann recognized that recent reforms curtailing
sovereign immunity were meaningful because " [e]ven in situations in
which litigants already had a cause of action against individual
public officials, making the government amenable to suit has
enhanced the chances of actual recovery, since officials often lack
the means to satisfy judgments rendered against them."

In

advocating the integration of the rules governing liability for
governmental

entities and their employees, Bermann contrasted

systems based primarily on official liability with those primarily
based on entity liability.

As to the former, Bermann recognized

that "[u]nless all public officials are made to carry a generous
quantity of liability insurance, or governments are made to carry
it for them, their frequent incapacity to satisfy large judgments
would make any such system unacceptable."

Jd.. at 1190.

The relevance of this factor to the open courts question
was recognized by Justice Durham's understated observation in
Condemarin that "[t]here is no reason to believe that individual
employees . . . are more able than their employers to respond in
damages or that the entities themselves are likely to be judgment
proof."

775 P.2d at 361 • In fact, the substituted remedy against

the entity is far more certain, and thus more valuable, than the
lost remedy against the individual.
12

Thus, the concern expressed

in Condemarin

that the

limited remedy under the damages caps was grossly inadequate to
fully compensate the seriously injured has significantly less
weight where the remedy that was eliminated was the common law
remedy against individual governmental employees. A multi-million
dollar judgment against one person in a government comprised of
"armies of anonymous and obscure civil servants" is likely to be
just as inadequate.

See Fleming James, Jr., Tort Liability of

Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 610, 640
(1955). See also Id. at 643 ("The rule of immunity of officers for
discretionary acts, and its extension, represent a judgment that
the benefits to be had from the personal liability of the officer
(especially since the prospect of actual compensation to the victim
from that source is slight) are outweighed by the evils that would
flow from a wider rule of liability."); Kenneth Culp Davis, 3
Administrative Law Treatise § 26.02 at 514 ("In the past, liability
of ministerial employees for their unintentional torts has been of
little

consequence,

for

such

employees

usually

have

been

financially irresponsible.")
Here, the parties have made no representations about the
financial responsibility of the medical resident who allegedly
negligently performed the bone marrow biopsy that caused Hipwell's
injuries and, ultimately, her death.

It is likely, however, that

even if they were entitled to recover against the resident at
common law, the plaintiffs would be little more satisfied with that
remedy than they are with their settlement against the hospital.
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Nor

the

concept

of

indemnification

Hipwell's chances of full recovery.

have

improved

As Bermann observed, "[t]he

most curious aspect of indemnification may be the widespread
assumption among scholars that it is in fact practiced . . . .
Yet, the assumption that the government generally indemnifies its
officials for service-related judgments, or pays those judgments
for them, may not be warranted . . . .
California Law Revision Commission

Fifteen years ago, when the
investigated

the sovereign

immunity problem for what was to become the state's governmental
tort claims legislation, it found the practice of indemnification
to be 'haphazard and incomplete.'

The little research that has

been done elsewhere tends to support this conclusion."

Moreover,

a "major drawback" of indemnification is that "because tort victims
still would have an action only against the individual official,
their interest in compensation would remain subordinate to the
latter's ability to pay."

Integrating Governmental and Officer

Tort Liability, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1175, 1193-94 (1977).
2.

The

Act

enhances

the

chances

of

recovery

by

eliminating the need to establish the fault of any individual
government employee.
In advocating a system based primarily on the liability
of the governmental entity, rather than the employee, Bermann
cogently observed:

"A further justification for accepting a

broader scope of governmental than officer liability is that some
losses occasioned by governmental activity may not be traceable to
any particular official.

For example, legislation may impose

14

duties upon the government

that the

latter

simply

fails to

implement. . . • More generally, however, a governmental operation
may suffer from inefficiency, delay or other systemic disorders
that cannot be laid at the feet of any particular official yet
still cause injury that warrants compensation."

Jd. at 1187.

While some cases, including this one, present no problem
in identifying the potentially culpable party, a large class of
cases exists in which the alleged fault is systemic —
particular blameworthy individual exists.

i.e., no

In the latter class of

cases, the substitution of a claim against the entity for the claim
against the individual actually creates a remedy where none existed
before.
Moreover, even where individual blame can be assessed,
the

benefits

gained

by

eliminating

the

need

to

pinpoint

responsibility in such cases are significant and inure to both the
plaintiff and the state. As noted by Bermann:
[T]he principle of exclusive governmental
liability offers distinct advantages from the
point of view of litigation. In its absence,
plaintiffs tend to sue multiple defendants as
a means of enhancing the likelihood of
ultimate recovery. An immediate consequence
of joining individual officials and the
government as defendants is that the official
may need independent legal representation in
order to enjoy a conflict-free defense. The
cost of those services may pose a major
financial hardship. Even if the government
pays the bill, as is often the case, the cost
will
consume
precious
tax
dollars.
Furthermore, adding defendants increases the
complexity of litigation in nearly every
procedural respect.
Compounding parties
usually means compounding substantive issues
as well.
Although removing the individual
official as defendant normally will not remove
15

him as witness, it may lessen and even obviate
the need to resolve issues such as good faith
or reasonableness upon which personal immunity
may depend. Sole governmental liability, in
short, promises aggrieved persons adequate
compensation
for
their
losses
while
eliminating
the
temptation
to
inject
unnecessary defendants and issues into the
litigation.
Id. at

1195.

In eliminating

the need

to prove

individual

liability, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act materially increases
the chance that at least some recovery will be obtained, thus
substantially improving the plaintiff's position from that at
common law.
III.
NEITHER
CREATES
INJURIES
THE OPEN

EQUAL PROTECTION NOR DUE PROCESS
A RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR PERSONAL
WHERE NO SUCH RIGHT IS ENCOMPASSED BY
COURTS CLAUSE

Hipwell contends that regardless of whether a right
protected by the open courts clause is at stake, the damages caps
offend both equal protection and due process by restricting an
individual right to recover for personal injuries that exists
independently of the open courts clause.
suggestion

that

such

a

right

was

Contrary to Hipwell's

implied

in

Condemarin

v.

University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), Justice Stewart, a
member of the plurality in that case, expressly disapproved any
reliance upon a substantive due process rationale.

j[d. at 369.

Moreover, Hipwell's contention appears to go well beyond
even the minority approach of Justices Durham and Zimmerman in
Condemarin, whose separate analyses were both firmly grounded in
the open courts clause. The minority recognized that to the extent
16

a previously existing right to recovery had been abrogated, the
open courts and due process guarantees overlapped.
disagreeing

with Justice

Stewart, they deemed

Therefore,

a due process

analysis which permitted a more flexible approach appropriate. 775
P.2d at 356-360 (J. Durham) and 366-69 (J. Zimmerman, concurring).
It is a giant leap from that view to according due process
protection to rights of recovery that had never previously existed.
POINT IV
THE ABROGATION OF SOME COMMON LAW REMEDIES
WHILE EXPANDING OTHER AVAILABLE REMEDIES WAS A
REASONABLE MEANS OF ACHIEVING
IMPORTANT
LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVES
In concluding his comprehensive analysis of the reform
movement that significantly abrogated the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in many states, including Utah, Arvo Van Alstyne noted the
emergence of limits on the trend:
What is occurring is, quite obviously,
not the total demise of the long-criticized
irresponsibility of public bodies for their
torts, but a restructuring of the rules which
determine
when
a
tort
committed
by
governmental action is compensable. A full
measure of public tort liability comparable to
that
of
private
persons
and
private
corporations is manifestly not realistically
to be expected of the present movement.
[Emphasis in original.] On the contrary, the
persistence
of
significant
areas
of
governmental immunity from liability for
injuries resulting from acts and omissions of
public employees will undoubtedly continue to
be characteristic of the law of most, if not
all, states.
It is already clear that the
crumbling citadel of immunity has stronger
foundations than had been generally perceived.
The rule of governmental irresponsibility for
tortious
injuries may have yielded to
crippling assaults upon its most vulnerable
outposts, but the inner bastions have
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generally survived the attack, more secure,
apparently than before.
In short, while substantially broader
liability is being increasingly accepted by
governmental bodies, a revised rationale has
begun to crystalize around a new and more
sharply defined set of hard-core governmental
immunities.
The traditional conceptual
distinctions
(e.g. the "governmental"
"proprietary" dichotomy) which so often
confused the prior law and bemused its critics
are being increasingly abandoned.
Instead,
recent developments stress the identification
of functional distinctions rooted in pragmatic
policy considerations as the most appropriate
guides to liability vel non . . . .
In the long run, the continuing ostensible
abrogation of governmental tort immunity will
be seen more as a general reordering of the
terms and conditions of governmental tort
responsibility than an eguating of public and
private tort law concepts.
[Emphasis added.]

Governmental Tort Liability:

A Decade of

Change, 1966 U. 111. L. Forum 919, 979-80.
Thus, despite the strong criticism that resulted from
their

having

been

extended

to

an

extreme,

the

traditional

justifications underlying the principle of sovereign
remain sound.

immunity

Unlike any private entity, no matter how large,

government provides a wide array of services that are essential to
the public, which can be performed effectively by no other entity
and which subject it to far greater potential liability than any
private party.

Unlike a private party, which may simply go out of

business or seek the protection of the bankruptcy court to avoid an
obligation

(thereby

leaving

its

tort victims uncompensated),

government, having the power to tax, is the ultimate "deep-pocket."
Given the economic and political restraints on taxation, however,
18

result of the vast potential liability of the state could be such
severe cutbacks in essential governmental services as to seriously
hamper state government.

"It is now recognized that under modern

concepts of tort law, the wide and varied activities of governments
may subject those entities to such liability that their activities
will be stymied.

It is also recognized that in order to be

effective,

government

must

often

be

active,

innovative

and

unafraid."

Thomas W. Rynard, Insurance and Risk Management for

State and Local Governments, § 6.01 at p. 4 (Matthew Bender 1991).6
Characterized by Van Alstyne as a "rare instance of
legislative initiative," the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was a
carefully

fashioned

response

Governmental Tort Liability;
Forum at 966.

to

these

legitimate

concerns.

A Decade of Change, 1966 U. 111. L.

The 1965 Act was preceded by a $25,000 two-year

study by a special committee of the Legislative Council of the
conditions under which immunity should be waived.

Report and

Recommendations of the Utah Legislative Council 1963-65 (Addendum
B).

The committee gathered extensive data on the experience of

other states, including those in which sovereign immunity had been
judicially abolished.

Ld.; see also 36th Utah Legislature, Record

of Senate Proceedings, January 18, 1985, comments of Sen. Charles

6

As the quoted statement suggests, Condemarin's requirement
that any infringement on a common law right of recovery be
"urgently and overwhelmingly necessary" is unduly restrictive and
essentially anti-governmental in effect.
To be effective,
government in a complex, post-modern society must be more than
simply solvent.
19

Welch, Jr.7
As recognized by this Court, and as shown in Point III
above, the overall effect of the Act was to "considerably broaden"
governmental liability.
P.2d

1230, 1235

Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605

(Utah 1980).

That broadening, however, was

accomplished not by simply expanding governmental liability acrossthe-board,

but

by

"reordering

the

governmental tort responsibility."
governmental

tort

terms

and

conditions

of

Because the common law of

liability depended

on conflicting

rules of

sovereign and official immunity, which in turn rested on such
unsatisfactory concepts as the discretionary/ministerial function
distinction, such a reordering necessarily involved the abrogation
of previously existing rights of recovery.
Thus, although~the common law permitted recovery against
individual governmental employees

in some circumstances while

foreclosing it against the state, the reasons for granting immunity
to employees may be stronger than those for shielding the

7

Condemarin noted that "[t]here is no factual showing in the
legislative history or the trial court that the recovery limitation
is reasonably necessary for preservation of the public treasury."
Because the Committee files were destroyed in accordance with State
record-keeping requirements, the bulk of the legislative history of
the Act is simply unavailable. The Court's suggestion that the
legislative policy must be justified by a factual showing in the
courts improperly treats the legislature as, in effect, a court of
record. If such a factual showing is deemed necessary, however,
the State agrees with Hipwell that this case should be remanded to
the trial court to provide the State the opportunity to make such
a showing. The State was not given notice of this action until
after this interlocutory appeal was taken and thus has had no such
opportunity here.
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governmental entity:
The absence of the government's vicarious
liability also means little assurance of
recovery to the victim of injurious official
action.
Since neither his master nor his
supervisor shares the officer's liability, any
recovery must come from the financially
weakest link in the chain. Such a principle
of liability may be likened to an inverted
pyramid; from a viewpoint which stresses the
importance
of
compensation
and
wide
distribution of losses among the beneficiaries
of the enterprise that causes them, the
present system is well-nigh the worst that can
be imagined.
"All in all, the traditional Anglo-American

system

of state

immunity coupled with the officer's liability may well be appraised
in Professor Robson's words;"
'The liability of the individual official for
wrongdoing committed in the course of his duty
on which so much praise has been bestowed by
English writers, is essentially a relic from
past centuries when government was in the
hands of a few prominent, independent and
substantial
persons,
so-called
Public
Officers, who were in no way responsible to
ministers or elected legislatures or councils
. . . Such doctrine is utterly unsuited to
the twentieth century state, in which the
Public Officer has been superseded by armies
of anonymous and obscure civil servants,
acting directly under the orders of their
superiors, who are ultimately responsible to
an elected body. The exclusive liability of
the individual officers is a doctrine typical
of a highly individual common law. It is of
decreasing value today.'
Fleming James, Jr., Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their
Officers. 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 610, 639-40 (1955).
The objective of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in
limiting recovery against government employees personally to cases
of fraud or malice was to correct this inverted pyramid.
21

Indeed,

this Court recognized as much in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627,
633 (Utah 1983):

"The apparent purpose of these two paragraphs

[sections 63-30-4(3) and (4)] is to replace the common law of
official immunity and its distinction between discretionary and
ministerial acts or omissions with a new standard coordinated with
the

standard

of

governmental

immunity

established

in

the

Governmental Immunity Act."
The balancing test used in various forms by the plurality
in Condemarin assesses the constitutionality of the abrogation of
common law remedies against government employees according to the
extent to which those particular remedies would threaten the public
treasury.

Ironically, that test fails even to take into account

the overall effect of the Act in "considerably broadening" other
remedies.

Aside from whether an equal protection or due process

analysis is appropriate, or whether minimal or heightened scrutiny
is required, Condemarin failed to accord appropriate weight to the
individual benefits created by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Even absent an "essentially comparable" substitute remedy for a
particular right that has been abrogated right by the Act, Berry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp. , 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985), the broadening
of other remedies by the Act must be taken into account in
assessing its constitutionality.

Taking that effect into account,

the Act's substitution of a limited remedy against the governmental
entity for the common law remedy against the employee was a
reasonable means of achieving important legislative objectives and
should be upheld.
22

CONCLUSION
Hipwell had no common law remedy against the State for
the injuries she sustained at the University Hospital because the
proprietary/governmental distinction did not apply to the State or
its subdivisions at common law and the State was absolutely immune
from liability.
governmental

Neither did Hipwell have a claim against any

employee

for

medical

malpractice

under

the

discretionary/ministerial function distinction as applied at common
law.

Thus, the damages caps did not transgress Hipwell's rights

under the open courts clause.

Neither were Hipwell's due process

or equal protection right infringed where the caps did not deprive
her of any common law right of recovery.
In substituting a limited remedy against the governmental
entity for the common law remedy against the individual, the Act
provided an "essentially comparable" remedy and thus complies with
the open courts clause in any event.

Moreover, taking the

broadening of other remedies by the Act into account in assessing
its constitutionality, the substitution of a limited remedy against
the governmental entity for the common law remedy against the
employee was a reasonable means of achieving important legislative
objectives.

Therefore, the damages caps should be upheld.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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day of December, 1992.
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Assistant Attorney General
23

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing brief of intervener was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Richard D. Burbidge
Stephen A. Mitchell
Gary Rhys Johnson
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
139 E. So, Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

SIMON H. FORGETTE
406 Market Street, Suite A
Kirkland, WA 98033
Paul Newman
Thomas L. Kay
Mark 0. Morris
SNELL & WILMER
60 East South Temple #800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Glenn C. Hanni
David R. Nielson
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this

jtf&day of December, 1992.

24

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
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History: Const 1896.

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in
either public or private facilities.
The management offloodwaters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation offloodand storm systems by governmental

63-30-3

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from those activities.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27,
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend§ 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, ch. 33, i 1; 1985, ment inserted "and other natural disasters" in
ch. 93, { 1.
the second paragraph.

63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity —
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Limitations on personal liability.
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall be
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar as
governmental entities or their employees are concerned. If immunity from
suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting any
immunityfromsuit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwise
assert under state or federal law.
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

63-30-4

employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority
is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil action or
proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless the
employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice.
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority,
unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due tofraudor
malice.
History: L, 1965, ch. 139, 5 4; 1978, ch. 27,
t 3; 1983, ch. 129, § 3.
Cross-References. — Compromise and settlement, § 63-30-18.

Payment of medical and similar expenses
not admissible to prove liability for injury,
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 409.

63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions —
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth
amendment rights [Effective until July 1, 1990].
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
or
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander,
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or
civil rights; or
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection or by reason of making
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it
is negligent or intentional; or
(g) arises out of or resultsfromriots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment
of taxes; or
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or
(k) arisesfromany natural condition on state lands or the result of any
activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(1) arises out of the activities of:
(i) providing emergency medical assistance;
(ii) fighting fire;
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or
hazardous waste; or
(iv) emergency evacuations; or
(m) arises out of research or implementation of cloud management or
seeding for the clearing of fog.
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

63-30-10

(2) (a) Immunityfromsuit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth
amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the
exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected rights.
(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are
held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2) shall be void and
governmental entities shall remain immune from suit for violations of
fourth amendment rights.

63-30-34. limit of judgment against governmental entity
or employee.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages for
personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person in
any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is characterized as governmental.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for property damage
against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity
has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the court
shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the damage is characterized as governmental.
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

63-30-35

(3) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages
awarded as compensation when a governmental entity has taken or damaged
private property without just compensation.
History: C. 1953, 63*30-34, enacted by L. 1983, ch. 130, § 3; 1987, ch. 75, § 9.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1983,
ch. 130, § 3 repealed former § 63-30-34, as
amended by Laws 1979, ch. 94, § 3, relating to
excess judgments, and enacted present
§ 63-30-34.

Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment added to the end of Subsections (1) and
(2) "regardless of whether or not the function
giving rise to the injury is characterized as
governmental," rewrote Subsection (3), and
ma de minor changes in phraseology.

ADDENDUM B

STATE OF UTAH
Report and Recommendations of
the Utah Legislative Council
1963-1965

PURSUANT TO TITLE 36, CHAPTER 4, SECTIONS 2
AND 11, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1853

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
DECEMBER, 1964
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the court in habitual truancy cases, clarification of the role of the probation officer, provision for some publicity in major delinquency cases,
clarification of the general purpose statement, definitions of neglected
and dependent child, qualifications of the probation staff, additional Judgeship for the second district and appointive powers of the senior Judge, also,
designation of the chief probation officer and defining action where adults
contribute to the delinquency of a juvenile.
The Committee recommends the Juvenile Court Act as representing an
effective, efficient, and conscientious effort on the part of well-qualified
individuals who have worked to prepare a bill in the best interests of the
State.

Governmental Immunity
The 1963 Legislature directed the Council "to study the effects upon
states, their political subdivisions and municipal corporations of waiver
of immunity from suit and consenting to be liable for the torts of its
officers, employees, and agent? as outlined in H.J.R. 21 of the 35th
Legislature." (S.J.R. 14, item 2.)

The Legislature considered this study

of such importance that it separately appropriated the sum of $25,000 and
directed the Council to appoint a committee with at least one-third of the
membership from the legal profession.

The Council appointed a committee of

twenty-one members, with representation from the Legislature, the cities,
counties, special taxing districts, school districts and other interests.
Bills have previously been introduced in the Legislature to .aive
governmental immunity.

In 1961 a bill was passed, then vetoed by the

Governor and in 1963 a bill was introduced but failed to pass.
Research activities include field investigations, gathering of data,
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assimilation of information, formulation of proposals, drafting of legislation, and the preparation of a final report.

Investigations of the claims

experience of the State and its political subdivisions has been included in
the Committee study.

The extent of insurance coverage by governmental entit

the cost of such insurance and claims experience have been part of the stud)
Questionnaires were sent to other states in regard to tort claims and consequential damage claims. The statutes of other states have been reviewed anc
catalogued.

The Utah Code has been carefully examined, section by section.

Case decisions have been studied.

Conferences have been held with insurance

personnel and rating information has been obtained from the National Bureau
of Casualty Underwriters.

Seven working drafts of legislation have been pri

pared and studied by the staff, by Committee members, and by the Executive
Committee.
The Committee considered the important questions of whether government,
icsnunity from suit was important in the State and whether legislation was
needed.
Numerous citizens have been injured in their person and property by
negligent acts of government employes and by the construction of public
improvements.

In many of these cases no recourse against the governmental

entity has been possible.

It was found that the present system wurks sub-

stantial injustice to citizens.

There is a fear, however, among government

officials, that to open the door to unrestrained claims would be too burden
aome upon governmental funds.
The Committee concluded that immunity of governmental entities should
be waived in relation to responsibility for the negligent acts or omissions
of public employees.

The Committee was not unanimous in its opinion regard

ing responsibility for consequential damage.

This latter type of claim is
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for indirect or consequential damage resulting from the construction of public improvements.

It is not necessarily the result of any negligence but is

merely the consequence of a particular government activity.
The question of payment of claims was a matter of concern to the Committee.
It was found that there is already a limited waiver of immunity in the State.
For example, cities and towns can be sued and must respond in relation to defective streets, sidewalks, culverts, and bridges.

The State Road Commission

has discretionary authority to pay individual claims up to $3,000 for injuries
resulting from the negligence of its employees.

The Fish and Game Commission

must pay for crop damage resulting from wildlife.

It was also found that

83/i of the political subdivisions responding to the survey already carry automobile insurance, and 307. of those carry comprehensive liability insurance.
On the basis of the best experience available, it appears that vehicle
insurance premiums and costs will show little increase should immunity be
waived, but there may be an increase of as much as five to six times in the
cost of general liability insurance.

There would probably be more claims

filed and some additional administrative costs incurred in handling these
claims.
There was unanimous approval by the committee members that governmental
entities should be legally authorized to purchase liability insurance to protect both the entity and the employee.
At the present time claims against the State are reviewed by the Board
of Examiners and then passed on to the Legislature for its review and appropriation or refusal*

If a state agency is not otherwise authorised by law to

pay claims, then the authority of the Board of Examiners must be recognized
and claims must be channelled through the Board.

. 48 -

The Committee has prepared a draft of legislation patterned after that
adopted in California and in some other states.

This legislation reaffirms

the rule of governmental immunity, thus eliminating any confusion in the lav,
and then carves out specific exceptions where, as a matter of justice, immunity from suit should be waived.
or unique rules of substantive
concerned.

No effort is made in the bill to create new
liability as far as governmental agencies are

Where immunity is waived, liability or responsibility would then

be determined by the courts.
A second bill has been prepared which is simply an authorization for the
permissive purchase of liability insurance.
immunity.

This latter bill does not waive

It would solve the problem of immunity only insofar as the govern-

mental entity chooses to purchase liability insurance, thereby referring all
claims to an insurance carrier.
If the Legislature meets the question of governmental immunity head-on,
it can consider the comprehensive draft which defines specific exceptions to
immunity and also provides for insurance coverage.

The second draft merely

permits the purchase of insurance coverage by the governmental entities.
The Committee recommends legislation to solve the problem of governmental immunity.

Justice of Peace
A follov-up to the study made by a State Bar Committee prior to the
1963 Legislature to determine the advisability of reforming the J. P. system
was assigned to a committee of the Council.

The Committee believes legisla-

tion is needed to accomplish the objectives of the assignment.

The J. P.

system is in need of reform and the Committee is preparing legislation to
permit the establishment of "community courts."

